Books

 

 


Journal Articles and Book Chapters

  • Line Ryberg Ingerslev. 'Ongoing: On Grief's Open-Ended Rehearsal'. Continental Philosophy Review (2017).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Atmosphere’ (second-author; co-authored with Louis Sass). Psychopathology 50/1: 90-97 (2017).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘How Anxiety Induces Verbal Hallucinations’ (first author; co-authored with Sam Wilkinson). Consciousness & Cognition 39: 48-58 (2016).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Thought Insertion Clarified’ (first author; co-authored with Sam Wilkinson). Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12): 246-269 (2015).
  • Line Ryberg Ingerslev. 'Responding to Incomprehensibility. On the Clinical Role of Anonymity in Bodily Symptoms' (co-authored with Dorothée Legrand). Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology (forthcoming).
  • Line Ryberg Ingerslev. 'A Broken Self-possession: Responsive Agency in Habits'. In Legrand, D. and Trigg, D. eds. (forthcoming) Unconsciousness Between Phenomenology and Psychoanalysis. Springer: Dortrecht.
  • Line Ryberg Ingerslev. 'Clinical Response to Bodily Symptoms in Psychopathology' (co-authored with Dorothée Legrand). Philosophy, Psychiatry, Psychology (forthcoming).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘The Interpersonal World of Psychosis’. World Psychiatry (2015; in press).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘The Phenomenology of Depression and the Nature of Empathy’. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17/2: 269-280 (2014).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘What is a Sense of Foreshortened Future? A Phenomenological Study of Trauma, Trust and Time’ (co-authored with Mark Ruddell and Benedict Smith). Frontiers in Psychology 5 (Article 1026): 1-11 (2014).
  • Line Ryberg Ingerslev. ‘Why the Capacity to Pretend Matters for Empathy’. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy 33/1: 201-213 (2014).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘What is it to Lose Hope?’ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12/4: 597-614 (2013). 
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Introduction: Emotional Experience in Depression’ (co-authored with Achim Stephan and Somogy Varga). Journal of Consciousness Studies 20/7-8: 10-14 (2013).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Phenomenology, Naturalism and the Sense of Reality’. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 72: 67-88 (2013).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘A Bad Case of the Flu? The Comparative Phenomenology of Depression and Somatic Illness (co-authored with Matthew Broome, Benedict Smith and Hannah Bowden). Journal of Consciousness Studies 20/7-8: 198-218 (2013).
  • Line Ryberg Ingerslev. ‘My Body as an Object: Self-distance and Social Experience’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. Special Issue: Psychosis 12/1: 163-178 (2013).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Bodily Feeling in Depersonalisation: a Phenomenological Account’ (co-authored with Giovanna Colombetti). Emotion Review 4/2: 145-150 (2012).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Varieties of Temporal Experience in Depression’. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37/2: 114-138 (2012).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy’. Inquiry 55/5: 473-495 (2012).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘What is Touch?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90/3: 413-432 (2012). Winner of the AJP 2012 ‘Best Paper Prize’.
  • Line Ryberg Ingerslev  ‘Die anthropologische Einstellung und die Frage der Natur’. Internationales Jahrbuch für Philosophische Anthropologie 3/1: 261-274 (2012).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Phenomenology is not a Servant of Science’. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 18/1: 33-36 (2011).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Stance, Feeling and Phenomenology’. Synthese 178: 121-130 (2011).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Binary Oppositions in Psychiatry: For or Against?’ Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 17/3: 233-239 (2010).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Depression, Guilt and Emotional Depth’. Inquiry 53: 602-626 (2010).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘There are no Folk Psychological Narratives’. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16/6-8: 379-406 (2009).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Existential Feeling and Psychopathology’, with peer commentaries by Andy Warsop and Charles Guignon, followed by my response ‘Belonging to the World through the Feeling Body’. Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 16/2: 179-211 (2009).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘The Problem with the Problem of Consciousness’. Synthesis Philosophica 44: 483-494 (2008). Special issue on ‘The Mystery of Consciousness’, Radman, Z., ed.
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Touch and Situatedness’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16/3: 299-322 (2008). Special issue on Situated Cognition, Ratcliffe, M. and Gallagher, S., eds.
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Farewell to Folk Psychology: A Response to Hutto’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16/3: 445-451 (2008). Special issue on Situated Cognition, Ratcliffe, M. and Gallagher, S. eds.
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘The Phenomenological Role of Affect in the Capgras Delusion’. Continental Philosophy Review 41/2: 195-216.
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘What is a Feeling of Unfamiliarity?’ Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology 14/1: 43-49 (2007).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘William James on Emotion and Intentionality’. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13/2: 179-202 (2005).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘An Epistemological Problem for Evolutionary Psychology’. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19/1: 47-63 (2005).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘The Feeling of Being’. Journal of Consciousness Studies 12/8-10: 45-63 (2005). Also in Thompson, E. and Colombetti, G. eds. (2005) Emotion Experience. Imprint Academic.
  • German translation published in Slaby, J. and Stephan, A. eds. (2011) Affektive Intentionalität. Paderborn: Mentis Verlag: 144-169
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Folk Psychology is not Folk Psychology’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5/1: 31-52 (2006).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Different Questions are not Different Meanings: Response to de Quincey’. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13/4: 30-32 (2006)
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Interpreting Delusions’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3/1: 25-48 (2004).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Realism, Biologism and “The Background”’. Philosophical Explorations 7/2: 149-166 (2004).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Teleology and the Assumption of Naturalism’ (survey review). Metascience 12/3: 312-321 (2003).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Scientific Naturalism and the Neurology of Religious Experience’. Religious Studies 39/3: 323-345 (2003).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Evolution and Belief: the Missing Question’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 33/1: 133-150 (2002).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Heidegger, Analytic Metaphysics and the Being of Beings’. Inquiry 45/1: 35-58 (2002).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Heidegger’s Attunement and the Neuropsychology of Emotion’. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1/3: 287-312 (2002).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘Husserl and Nagel on Subjectivity and the Limits of Physical Objectivity’. Continental Philosophy Review 35/4: 353-377 (2002).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘A Kantian Stance on the Intentional Stance’. Biology and Philosophy 16/1: 29-52 (2001).
  • Matthew Ratcliffe. ‘The Function of Function’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 31/1:113-133 (2000)